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Abstract
Effective defense of deep neural networks against adver-
sarial attacks remains a challenging problem, especially
under powerful white-box attacks. In this paper, we de-
velop a new method called ensemble generative cleaning
with feedback loops (EGC-FL) for effective defense of deep
neural networks. The proposed EGC-FL method is based
on two central ideas. First, we introduce a transformed
deadzone layer into the defense network, which consists of
an orthonormal transform and a deadzone-based activation
function, to destroy the sophisticated noise pattern of adver-
sarial attacks. Second, by constructing a generative clean-
ing network with a feedback loop, we are able to generate
an ensemble of diverse estimations of the original clean im-
age. We then learn a network to fuse this set of diverse
estimations together to restore the original image. Our ex-
tensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach
improves the state-of-art by large margins in both white-box
and black-box attacks. It significantly improves the classi-
fication accuracy for white-box PGD attacks upon the sec-
ond best method by more than 29% on the SVHN dataset
and more than 39% on the challenging CIFAR-10 dataset.
1. Introduction
Researchers have recognized that deep neural networks
are sensitive to adversarial attacks [32]. Very small changes
of the input image can fool the state-of-art classifier with
very high success probabilities. The attackers often gen-
erate noise patterns by exploiting the specific network ar-
chitecture of the target deep neural network so that small
noise at the input layer can accumulate along the network
inference layers, finally exceed the decision threshold at the
output layer, and result in false decision. On the other hand,
we know a well-trained deep neural networks are robust to
random noise [1], such as Gaussian noise. Therefore, the
key issue in network defense is to destroy the sophisticated
pattern or accumulative process of the attack noise while
Figure 1. Illustration of the proposed ensemble generative cleaning
with feedback loops for defending adversarial attacks.
preserving the original image content or network classifica-
tion performance.
During the past few years, a number of methods have
been proposed to construct adversarial samples to attack
the deep neural networks, including fast gradient sign
(FGS) method [10], Jacobian-based saliency map attack (J-
BSMA) [26], and projected gradient descent (PGD) attack
[18, 20]. Different classifiers can be failed by the same ad-
versarial attack method [32]. The fragility of deep neural
networks and the availability of these powerful attacking
methods present an urgent need for developing effective de-
fense methods. Meanwhile, deep neural network defense
methods have also been developed, including adversarial
training [18, 32], defensive distillation [27, 4, 24], Mag-
net [21], and featuring squeezing [13, 41]. It has been rec-
ognized that these methods suffer from significant perfor-
mance degradation under strong attacks, especially white-
box attacks with large magnitude and iterations [29].
In this work, we explore a new approach, called ensem-
ble generative cleaning with feedback loop (EGC-FL), to
defend deep neural network against powerful adversarial
attacks. Our approach is motivated by the following ob-
servation: (1) the adversarial attack has sophisticated noise
patterns which should be disturbed or destroyed during the
defense process. (2) The attack noise, especially those pow-
erful white-box attacks, such as the PGD and BPDA attacks
[2], are often generated with an iterative process. To clean
them, we also need an iterative process with multiple rounds
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of cleaning to achieve effective defense.
Motivated by these observations, our proposed EGC-FL
approach first introduces a transformed deadzone (TDZ)
layer into the defense network, which consists of an or-
thonormal transform and a deadzone-based activation func-
tion, to destroy the sophisticated noise pattern of adversarial
attacks. Second, it introduces a new network structure with
feedback loops, as illustrated in Figure 1, into the generative
cleaning network. This feedback loop network allows us to
remove the residual attack noise and recover the original im-
age content in an iterative fashion. Specifically, over multi-
ple feedback iterations, the EGC-FL network generates an
ensemble of cleaned estimations of the original image. Ac-
cordingly, we also learn an accumulative image fusion net-
work which is able to fuse the new estimation with existing
result in an iterative fashion. According to our experiments,
this feedback and iterative process converges very fast, of-
ten within 2 to 4 iterations. Our extensive experimental re-
sults on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our EGC-FL
approach improves the state-of-art by large margins in both
white-box and black-box attacks. It significantly improves
the classification accuracy for white-box attacks upon the
second best method by more than 29% on the SVHN dataset
and more than 39% on the challenging CIFAR-10 dataset
with PGD attacks.
The major contributions of this work can be summa-
rized as follows. (1) We have introduced a transform dead-
zone layer into the defense network to effectively destroy
the noise pattern of adversarial attacks. (2) We have de-
veloped a new network structure with feedback loops to re-
move adversarial attack noise and recover original image
content in an iterative manner. (3) We have successfully
learned an accumulative image fusion network which is able
to fuse the incoming sequence of cleaned estimations and
recover the original image in an iterative manner. (4) Our
new method has significantly improved the performance of
the state-of-the-art methods in the literature under a wide
variety of attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews related work. The proposed EGC-FL method is
presented in Section 3. Experimental results, performance
comparisons with existing methods, and ablation studies are
provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
In this section, we review related work on adversarial
attack and network defense methods which are two tightly
coupled research topics. The goal of attack algorithm de-
sign is to fail all existing network defense methods, while
the goal of defense algorithms is to defend the deep neural
networks against all existing adversarial attack methods.
(A) Attack methods. Attack methods can be divided
into two threat models: white-box attacks and black-box at-
tacks. The white-box attacker has full access to the classi-
fier network parameters, network architecture, and weights.
The black-box attacker has no knowledge of or access to
the target network. For white-box attack, a simple and fast
approach called Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method has been
developed by Goodfellow et al. [10] using error back prop-
agation to directly modify the original image. Kurakin et al.
[18] apply FGS iteratively and propose BIM. Carlini et al.
[4] designed an optimization-based attack method, called
Carlini-Wagner (C&W) attack, which is able to fool the tar-
get network with the smallest perturbation. Xiao et al. [37]
trained a generative adversarial network (GAN) [9] to gen-
erate perturbations. Kannan et al. [17] found that the Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) is the strongest among all
attack methods. It can be viewed as a multi-step variant of
FGSk [20]. Athalye et al. [2] introduced a method, called
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA), to
attack networks where gradients are not available. It it-
eratively computes the adversarial gradient on the defense
results. It is able to successfully attack all existing state-
of-the-arts defense methods. For black-box attacks, the at-
tacker has no knowledge about the target classifier. Paper-
not et al. [25] introduced the first approach for black-box
attack using a substitute model. Dong et al. [8] proposed a
momentum-based iterative algorithms to improve the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples. Xie et al. [40] boosted
the transferability of adversarial examples by creating di-
verse input patterns.
(B) Defense methods. Several approaches have recently
been proposed for defending both white-box attacks and
black-box attacks. Adversarial training trains the target
model using adversarial examples [32, 10]. Madry et al.
[20] suggested that training with adversarial examples gen-
erated by PGD improves the robustness. [21] proposed
a method, called MagNet, which detects the perturbations
and then reshape them according to the difference between
clean and adversarial examples. Recently, there are sev-
eral defense methods based on GANs have been developed.
Samangouei et al. [29] projected the adversarial examples
into a trained generative adversarial network (GAN) to ap-
proximate the input using generated clean image. Recently,
some defense methods have been developed based on in-
put transformations. Guo et al. [11] proposed several in-
put transformations to defend the adversarial examples, in-
cluding image cropping and re-scaling, bit-depth reduction,
and JPEG compression. Xie et al. [38] proposed to de-
fend against adversarial attacks by adding a randomization
layer, which randomly re-scales the image and then ran-
domly zero-pads the image. Jia et al. [15] proposed an
image compression framework to defend adversarial exam-
ples, called ComDefend. Xie et al. [39] introduced a feature
denoising method for defending PGD white-box attacks.
Figure 2. Framework of the proposed ensemble generative cleaning network for defending adversarial attacks.
3. The Proposed Method
In this section, we present our method of ensemble gen-
erative cleaning with feedback loops for defending adver-
sarial attacks.
3.1. Overview
As illustrated in Figure 1, our proposed method of en-
semble generative cleaning with feedback loops (EGC-FL)
for defending adversarial attacks is based on two main
ideas: (1) we introduce a transformed deadzone layer into
the cleaning network to destroy the sophisticated noise pat-
terns of adversarial attacks. (2) We introduce a generative
cleaning network with a feedback loop to generate a se-
quence of diverse estimations of the original image, which
will be fused in an accumulative fashion to restore the orig-
inal image.
Figure 2 shows a more detailed framework of the pro-
posed EGC-FL method. The attacked image X∗ is first pre-
processed by a convolutional layer P and then passed to the
transformed deadzone layer Φ, which aims to destroy the
sophisticated noise patterns of the adversarial attacks. To
remove the residual attack noise in X˜ and recover the orig-
inal image content X , the generative cleaning network G
generates a series of estimations of the original image using
a feedback loop. The feedback network consists of three
converter networks, U, V, and W, which are fully convo-
lutional layers. These three converter networks are used to
normalize the output features from different networks be-
fore they are concatenated or fused together. At the k-th
feedback loop, let X¯k be the output of the generative clean-
ing network G. We concatenate the output X¯k and the orig-
inal X˜ after being normalized by converter networks U and
V, respectively. The concatenated feature map is then nor-
malized by converter W before feeding back to the genera-
tive cleaning network G to produce the output X¯k+1. This
feedback loop is summarized by the following formula:
X¯k+1 = G{W[V(X˜) unionmultiU(X¯k)]}, (1)
where unionmulti represents the cascade operation. This ensemble
Figure 3. Activation function for the TDZ layer.
generative cleaning network with feedback will generate a
series of cleaned versions {X¯k|k = 1, 2, · · · }, representing
a diverse set of estimations of the original image X . To
recover the original imageX , we introduce an accumulative
image fusion network Γ, which operates as follows
Xˆk+1 = Γ(Xˆk, X¯k). (2)
Specifically, the input to the fusion network Γ are two im-
ages: X¯k which is the current output from the generative
cleaning network G, and Xˆk which is the current fused im-
age produced by Γ. The generative cleaning network G is
separated from the accumulative fusion network Γ so that
the generative network can generate multiple estimations
of the original image. The fusion network can then fuse
them together. In other words, the output of Γ is fed back
to itself as the input for the next round of fusion. All net-
works, including the convolution pre-processing, the gener-
ative cleaning network, converter networks, and the accu-
mulative fusion network are learned from our training data,
which will be explained in more detail in the following sec-
tions.
3.2. Transformed Deadzone Layer
The goal of the transformed deadzone layer in our de-
fense network is to destroy the noise pattern and perform
the first round of removal of the adversarial attack noise.
Let X be the original image and x(i, j) be its pixel at loca-
tion (i, j). The attacked image is given by X∗ = X + α
where α is adversarial attack with magnitude  and α(i, j)
is the attack noise at pixel location (i, j), which is a ran-
dom variable with maximum magnitude of . We have
x∗(i, j) = x(i, j)+α(i, j). In the spatial domain, it is very
challenging to separate the attack noise from the original
image content since the attacked image X∗ and the original
image X are visually very similar to each other perceptu-
ally.
To address this issue, we propose to first transform
the image using a de-correlation or energy compaction or-
thonormal transform matrix T. One choice of this trans-
form is the blockwise discrete cosine transform (DCT) [34].
After this transform, the energy of the original image will
be aggregated onto a small fraction of transform coefficients
with the remaining coefficients being very close to zeros.
We then pass this transformed image through a deadzone
activation function η(x) shown in Figure 3. Here, η(x) = 0
if x ∈ [−δ, δ]. Otherwise η(x) = x. Since the transform is
linear, the transformed image after the deadzone activation
is given by
η(T ·X∗) = η(T ·X + T · α), (3)
η(x∗t (i, j)) = η(xt(i, j)) + η(αt(i, j)) (4)
≈ η(xt(i, j)). (5)
Statistically, the attack noise is white noise. After trans-
form, αt(i, j) remains white noise. Notice that a vast ma-
jority of transform coefficients xt(i, j) in the transformed
image T ·X will be very small. In this case, the deadzone ac-
tivation function η(x) will largely remove the transformed
attack noise αt(i, j). Meanwhile, since the major image
content or energy has be aggregated onto a smaller num-
ber large-valued coefficients, which remain unchanged by
the deadzone function. In this way, the energy-compaction
transform is able to help protecting the original image con-
tent from being damaged by the deadzone activation func-
tion during removal of attack noise. Certainly, it will still
cause some damage to the original image content since
the small transform coefficients xt(i, j) are forced to ze-
ros. Figure 4 shows the energy of the attack noise before
and after the TDZ, namely, ||α||2 = ||X − X∗||2 and
||Γ(X) − Γ(X∗)||2, for 860 test images organized in 215
batches. Here Γ(·) represents the transformed deadzone op-
eration. We can see that the energy of attack noise has been
significantly reduced. Certainly, some parts of the original
image content, especially those high-frequency details, are
also removed, which need to be recovered by the subsequent
generative cleaning network.
3.3. Learning the Ensemble Generative Cleaning
Network
In our defense method design, the generative cleaning
network G, the feedback loop U,V,W and accumula-
tive fusion network Γ are jointly trained. The goal of our
Figure 4. The energy of attack noise before and after the trans-
formed TDZ for 860 test images from 215 batches.
method is three-fold: (1) first, the generative cleaning net-
work G needs to make sure that the original image content
is largely recovered. (2) Second, the feedback loop needs
to successfully remove the residual attack noise. (3) Third,
the accumulative fusion network Γ needs to iteratively re-
cover the original image content. To achieve the above three
goals, we formulate the following generative loss function
for training the networks
L = λ1LP + λ2LA + λ3LC , (6)
where LP is perceptual loss, LA is the adversarial loss and
LC is the cross-entropy loss. λi is a weighting parameter. In
our experiments, we set it to be 1/3. To define the perceptual
loss, the L2-norm between the recovered image Xˆk and the
original image X is used [16]. In this work, we observe
that the small adversarial perturbation often leads to very
substantial noise in the feature map of the network [39].
Motivated by this, we use a pre-trained VGG-19 network,
denoted by Fβ to generate visual features for the recovered
image Xˆk and the original image X , and use their feature
difference as the perceptual loss LP . Specifically,
LP = ||Fβ(X)− Fβ(Xˆk)||22. (7)
The adversarial loss LA aims to train generative cleaning
network G and the feedback loop U,V,W so that the re-
covered images will be correctly classified by the target net-
work. It is formulated as
LA = ||G{W[V(X˜) unionmultiU(X¯k)]} −X||22. (8)
We train our accumulative fusion network Γ, along with the
generative cleaning network G, to optimize the following
loss function:
LC = EX∈ΩΦ[Γ(Xˆk, X¯k), Iclean]. (9)
Here, Φ[·, ·] represents the cross-entropy between the out-
put generated by the generative network and the target label
Table 1. Performance of our method (classification accuracy after defense) against white-box attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset ( = 8/256).
Some methods did not provide results on specific attack methods, which were left blank (marked with (NA) ).
Defense Methods Clean FGS PGD BIM C&W
No Defense 94.38% 31.89% 0.00% 0.00% 0.99%
Label Smoothing [36] 92.00% 54.00% (NA) 8.00% 2.00%
Feature Squeezing [41] 84.00% 20.00% (NA) 0.00% 78.00%
PixelDefend [30] 85.00% 70.00% (NA) 70.00% 80.00%
Adv. Network [35] 91.08% 72.81% 44.28% (NA) (NA)
Parametric Noise Injection (PNI) [14] 85.17% 56.51% 49.07% (NA) (NA)
Sparse Transformation Layer (STL) [31] 90.11% 87.15% (NA) 88.03% 89.04%
Our Method 91.65% 88.51% 88.61% 88.75% 90.03%
Gain +1.36% +39.54% +0.72% +0.99%
Iclean for clean images. With the above loss functions, our
ensemble generative cleaning network learns to iteratively
recover adversarial images.
The accumulative fusion network Γ acts as a multi-
image restoration network for original image reconstruc-
tion. Cascaded with the generative cleaning network G,
it will guide the training of G and feedback loop network
using back propagation of gradients from its own network,
aiming to minimize the above loss function. In our design,
during the adversarial learning process, the target classifier
C is called to determine if the recovered image Xˆk is clean
or not, as illustrated in Figure 2. The output of Γ is fed back
to itself as the input to enhance the next round of fusion.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we implement and evaluate our EGC-FL
defense method and compare its performance with state-
of-the-art defense methods under a wide variety of attacks,
with both white-box and black-box attack modes.
4.1. Experimental Settings
Our experiments are implemented on the Pytorch plat-
form [28]. Our proposed method is implemented on the
AdverTorch [7] in both white and black-box attack modes,
including the BPDA attack [2]. We choose the CIFAR-10
and SVHN (Street View House Number) datasets for per-
formance evaluations and comparisons since most recent
papers reported results on these two datasets. The CIFAR-
10 dataset consists of 60,000 images in 10 classes of size
32× 32. The Street View House Numbers (SVHN) dataset
[23] has about 200K images of street numbers. For each of
these two datasets, a classifier is independently trained on
its training set, and the test set is used for evaluations.
4.2. Results on the CIFAR-10 Dataset
We compare the performance of our defense method
with state-of-the-art methods developed in the literature un-
der five different white-box attacks: (1) FGS attack [10],
Table 2. BPDA attack results on CIFAR-10 dataset. Results with
∗ are achieved with additional adversarial training.
Defense Methods Accuracy
Thermometer Encodings (TE) [3] 0.00%∗
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) [6] 0.00%
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) [19] 5.00%
PixelDefend [30] 9.00%∗
Cascade Adv. Training (L∞=0.015) [22] 15.00%
PGD Adv. Training [20] 47.00%∗
Sparse Transformation Layer (STL) [31] 42.00%∗
Our Method 85.77%∗
Gain +38.77%
Table 3. Performance of our method against black-box attacks on
CIFAR-10 ( = 8/256).
Defense Methods No Attack FGS PGD
No Defense 94.38% 63.21% 38.71%
Adv. PGD [33] 83.50% 57.73% 55.72%
Adv. Network [35] 91.32% 77.23% 74.04%
Our Method 91.65% 79.09% 82.78%
Gain +1.86% +8.74%
(2) PGD attack [20], (3) BIM attack [18], (4) C&W attack
[5], and (5) BPDA attack [2]. Following [17] and [35],
the white-box attackers generate adversarial perturbations
within a range of  = 8/255. In addition, we set the step
size of attackers to be  = 1/255 with 10 attack iterations
as the baseline setting.
We generate the perturbed images for training using
PGD attacks and tested for all attack methods. During train-
ing, we set the iteration number K = 3. The perturbed
images are used as the input, passing through our EGC-FL
network for 3 iterations. But, during test, K is flexible. In
our white-box attack experiments, we unfold the feedback
loops so that the attacker has full access to the end-to-end
defense network, including the number of iterations.
Table 4. Performance of our method against white-box attacks on
SVHN ( = 12/256).
Defense Methods No Attack FGS PGD
No Defense 96.21% 50.36% 0.15%
M-PGD [20] 96.21% (NA) 44.40%
ALP [17] 96.20% (NA) 46.90%
Adv. PGD [33] 87.45% 55.94% 42.96%
Adv. Network [35] 96.21% 91.51% 37.97%
Our Method 94.00% 94.10% 76.67%
Gain +2.59% +29.77%
(1) Defending against white-box attacks. Table 1
shows image classification accuracy with 6 defense meth-
ods: (1) Label Smoothing [36], (2) Feature Squeezing [41],
(3) PixelDefend [30], (4) Adversarial Network [35], (5) the
PNI (Parametric Noise Injection) method [14], and (6) the
STL (Sparse Transformation Layer) method [31]. The sec-
ond column shows the classification accuracy when the in-
put images are all clean. We can see that some methods,
such as the PixelDefend [30], Feature Squeezing [41], and
PNI [14], degrade the classification accuracy of clean im-
ages. This implies that their defense methods have caused
significant damages to the original images, or they cannot
accurately tell if the input image is clean or being attacked.
Since our method has a strong reconstruction capacity, the
ensemble of reconstructed images still preserve the useful
information. The rest four columns list the final image clas-
sification accuracy with different defense methods. For all
of these four attacks, our methods significantly outperforms
existing methods. For example, for the powerful PGD at-
tack, our method outperforms the Adv. Network and the
PNI method by more than 39%.
(2) Defending against the BPDA attack. The Back-
ward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [2] at-
tack is very challenging to defend since it can iteratively
strengthen the adversarial examples using gradient approx-
imation according to the defense mechanism. BPDA also
targets defenses in which the gradient does not optimize the
loss. This is the case for our method since the transformed
deadzone layer is non-differentiable. Table 2 summarizes
the defense results of our algorithm in comparison with
other seven methods: (1) Thermometer Encodings (TE) [3],
(2) Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) [6], (3) Local In-
trinsic Dimensionality (LID) [19], (4) PixelDefend [30], (5)
Cascade Adversarial Training [22], (6) PGD Adversarial
Training [20], and (7) Sparse Transformation Layer (STL)
[31]. We choose these methods for comparison since the
original BPDA paper [2] has reported results of these meth-
ods. We can see that our EGC-FL network is much more ro-
bust than other defense methods on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
outperforming the second best by more than 38%.
(3) Defending against black-box attacks. We generate
the black-box adversarial examples using FGS and PGD at-
tacks with a substitute model [25]. The substitute model
is trained in the same way as the target classifier with a
ResNet-34 network [12] structure. Table 3 shows the per-
formance of our defense mechanism under back-box attacks
on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The adversarial examples are
constructed with  = 8/256 under the substitute model. We
observe that the target classifier is much less sensitive to ad-
versarial examples generated by FGS and PGD black-box
attacks than the white-box ones. But the powerful PGD at-
tack is still able to decrease the overall classification accu-
racy to a very low level, 38.71%. We compare our method
with the Adversarial PGD [20] and Adversarial Network
[35] methods. We include these two because they are the
only ones that provide performance results on CIFAR-10
with black-box attacks. From the Table 3, we can see our
method improves the accuracy by 8.74% over the state-of-
the-art Adversarial Network method for the PGD attack.
4.3. Results on the SVHN Dataset.
We evaluate our EGC-FL method on the SVHN dataset
with comparison with four state-of-the-art defense methods:
(1) M-PGD (Mixed-minibatch PGD ) [20], (2) ALP (Ad-
versarial Logit Pairing) [17], (3) Adversarial PGD [33], and
(4) Adversarial Network [35]. For the SVHN dataset, as in
the existing methods [17, 35], we used the Resnet-18 [12]
for the target classifier. The average classification accuracy
is 96.21%. We use the same parameters as in [17] for the
PGD attack with a total magnitude of  = 0.05 (12/255).
Within each single step, the perturbation magnitude is set to
be  = 0.01 (3/255) and 10 iterative steps are used.
(1) Defending against white-box attacks. Table 4 sum-
marizes the experimental results and performance compar-
isons with those four existing defense methods. We can see
that on this dataset the PGD attack is able to decrease the
overall classification accuracy to an extremely low level,
0.15%. Our algorithm outperforms existing methods by a
very large margin. For example, for the PGD attack, our al-
gorithm outperforms the second best ALP [17] algorithm by
more than 29%. With the FGS attacks, the iterative clean-
ing process will produce image versions with more diversity
than the clean image without attack noise. This helps recon-
struct the original image.
(2) Defending against black-box attacks. We also per-
form experiments of defending black-box attacks on the
SVHN dataset. Table 5 summarizes our experimental re-
sults with the powerful PGD attack and provides the com-
parison with those four methods. We can see that our ap-
proach outperforms other methods by 2.25% for the FGS
attacks and 5.37% for the PGD attacks. From the above
results, we can see that our proposed method is particularly
effective for defense against the strong attacks, for example,
Table 5. Performance of our method against black-box attacks on
SVHN ( = 12/256).
Defense Methods No Attack FGS PGD
No Defense 96.21% 69.91% 67.66%
M-PGD [20] 96.21% (NA) 55.40%
ALP [17] 96.20% (NA) 56.20%
Adv. PGD [33] 87.45% 87.41% 83.23%
Adv. Network [35] 96.21% 91.48% 81.68%
Our Method 94.00% 94.03% 88.60%
Gain +2.55% +5.37%
Figure 5. The perturbed-data accuracy of ResNet-18 under adver-
sarial attack (Top) versus number of attack iteration, and (Bottom)
versus perturbation magnitude (under L∞) on CIFAR-10 dataset.
the PGD attacks with large iteration steps and noise magni-
tude.
4.4. Ablation Studies and Algorithm Analysis
In this section, we provide in-depth ablation study results
of our algorithm to further understand its capability.
(1) Defense against large-iteration and large-epsilon
attacks. Figure 5 (Top) shows the performance results un-
der large-iteration PGD and BPDA attacks. We can see that
the large-iteration PGD attack significantly degrades the ac-
curacy of the Vanilla Adversary Training method (VAT)
[20] and the PNI (Parametric Noise Injection) method [14],
as well as our method. But, our method significantly out-
performs the other two. In both cases, the perturbed-
data accuracy starts saturating without further drop when
Table 6. Performance of our method with feedback loops under
adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10 dataset.
Attack Method Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4
FGS 57.64% 78.04% 78.15% 78.31%
PGD 78.46% 85.36% 86.25% 86.55%
BPDA 19.40% 79.12% 79.28% 79.79%
Nstep ≥ 50. In Figure 5 (Top), we also include the perfor-
mance results of our method under large-iteration BPDA at-
tacks. We set the adversarial perturbations within a range of
 = 12/255 with 10 attack iterations as the baseline setting.
This result is not reported by other methods so we could not
include them for comparison. We can see that the BPDA
attack is much more powerful. But, our algorithm can still
survive large-iteration BPDA attacks and largely maintain
the defense performance.
Figure 5 (bottom) shows comparison results against at-
tacks with large perturbation magnitude. We can see that
our method significantly outperforms the VAT and PNI
defense methods even when the magnitude of adversarial
noise is increased to  = 0.3 under the PGD attack. We
also include the performance of our method under large-
BPDA attacks. We can see that our method is robust under
very powerful attacks of large magnitudes.
(2) Analyze the impact of feedback loops. We notice
that the feedback loop network plays an important role in
the defense. In our method, the key parameter controlling
the image quality is the number of feedback loop k. We
gradually increase k and explore classification accuracy of
the fused image. Table 6 shows the performance (classifica-
tion accuracy after defense) of our method on the CIFAR-
10 dataset with various attacks. We denote Genk as the
number of feedback loops. We can see that the feedback
loops within the range of 3 or 4 yields the best performance.
One feedback loop does not provide efficient defense since
the EGC-FL network is not able to fully destroy the attack
noise pattern and restore useful information. Once the key
features in the original image have been reconstructed, the
classification accuracy will be stable and maintain the high-
est performance, although the image quality may get even
better with accumulative fusion. In Figure 6, we show sam-
ple images from the CIFAR-10 when our method is applied.
The first column is the clean image without attacks. The
second column is attacked image. The third to last columns
are reconstructed images of 4 generations by our EGC-FL
method. We can see that our algorithm is able to remove the
attack noise and largely recover the original image content.
(3) In-depth analysis of major algorithm components.
In the following ablation studies, we perform in-depth anal-
ysis of major components of our EGC-FL algorithm, which
includes the transform, deadzone, and the EGC network
with feedback loops. In Table 7, the first row shows the
Figure 6. Adversarial images and their fused image produced by
our method.
Table 7. Performance analysis of algorithm components.
Defense Methods FGS PGD BPDA
Our Method (Full Alg.) 88.51% 88.04% 85.77%
- Without Transform 79.32% 79.35% 79.62%
- Without Feedback 77.12% 78.46% 19.37%
classification accuracy of images after defense with our pro-
posed EGC-FL method (full algorithm) on the CIFAR-10
dataset with FGS, PGD, and BPDA attacks. The second
row shows results without the transform. We can see that
the accuracy drops about 7-9%. The transform module is
important because it can help protecting the original con-
tent from being damaged by the deadzone activation func-
tion δ(x) by aggregating the energy of the original image
into a small number of large transform coefficients. The
third row shows the results without the feedback loop. We
can see that it drops the accuracy by 10-11% under the FGS
and PGD attacks. For the powerful BPDA attack, the drop
is very dramatic, about 66%. With multiple feedback loops
for progressive attack noise removal and original image re-
construction, it can significantly improve the defense per-
formance, especially under powerful BPDA attacks.
(4) Visualizing the defense process. Network defense
is essentially a denosing process of the feature maps. To
further understand how the the proposed EGC-FL method
works, we visualize the feature maps of original, attacked,
and EGC-FL cleaned images. We use the feature map from
the activation layer, the third from the last layer in the net-
work. Figure 7 shows two examples. In the first exam-
ple, the first row is the original image (classified into ter-
rapin), its gradient-weighted class activation heatmap, and
the heatmap overlaid on the original image. The heatmap
shows which parts of the original image the classification
network is paying attention to. The second row shows the
Figure 7. Each pair of examples are feature maps corresponding to
clean images (top), to their adversarial perturbed images (middle)
and to their reconstructed images (bottom).
attacked image (being classified into cobra), heatmap, and
the heatmap overlaid on the attacked image. We can see that
the feature map is very noisy and the heatmap is distorted.
The third row shows the EGC-cleaned images. We can see
that both the feature map and heatmaps have been largely
restored.
5. Conclusion
We have developed a new method for defending deep
neural networks against adversarial attacks based on the
EGC-FL network. This network is able to recover the orig-
inal image while cleaning up the residual attack noise. We
introduced a transformed deadzone layer into the defense
network, which consists of an orthonormal transform and a
deadzone-based activation function, to destroy the sophisti-
cated noise pattern of adversarial attacks. By constructing
a generative cleaning network with a feedback loop, we are
able to generate an ensemble of diverse estimations of the
original clean image. We then learned a network to fuse
this set of diverse estimation images together to restore the
original image. Our extensive experimental results demon-
strated that our approach outperforms the state-of-art meth-
ods by large margins in both white-box and black-box at-
tacks. Our ablation studies have demonstrated that the ma-
jor components of our method, the transformed deadzone
layer and the ensemble generative cleaning network with
feedback loops, are both critical, contributing significantly
to the overall performance.
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